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I. INTRODUCTION
Commentators have pointed out that the notion of authorship enshrined in copyright law is at odds with the prevalence of copying in
contemporary art.1 Copyright law envisions a creator who beholds an
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a response to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Litigation associate at Cline Williams Wright Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P.
1. See, e.g., Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559, 563
(2016) (“[T]he transformative inquiry asks precisely the wrong questions about
contemporary art. It requires courts to search for ‘meaning’ and ‘message’ when

697

698

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:697

idea, purposes its expression, and fixes it in a work. While this approximation of the creative process may, on the whole, advance the Copyright Act’s purpose of incentivizing the progression of the arts, it also
vastly simplifies that process. Special consideration should be given to
modes of artistic production that this model fails to capture to ensure
copyright law does not fail to reap its value in social benefit and artistic progress. Congress and the courts have given such consideration
through the fair use affirmative defense.2 This Article addresses the
application of that defense to a vein of contemporary art which makes
it a point to take and re-present preexisting works—appropriation art.
A number of scholars have addressed the manner in which appropriation art should be evaluated under the fair use defense and, in
particular, how a court is to ascertain whether a piece of appropriation
art is “transformative,” a central component of the fair use inquiry.
Given the many valuable insights already presented on how fair use
could be remade or conceptualized in view of artistic practice, this Article seeks merely to suggest an approach that advocates and judges
could realistically put into practice.3 The components of this approach
are: (1) a threshold inquiry into whether the work in question is appropriation art, in which event it is transformative as a matter of law
and entitled to a categorical approach of the fair use inquiry; and (2) a
determination of how much of the borrowed work the defendant is entitled to use under a three-tiered approach.
Part II sets forth the fair use doctrine and its application to parody
under Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. Part III argues that appropriation art as an artistic strategy (for want of a better term, “appropriative use”) should be viewed as a distinct category of art subject to
one goal of so much current art is to throw the idea of stable meaning into play. It
requires courts to ask if that message is ‘new’ when so much contemporary art
rejects the goal of newness, using copying as a primary building block of creativity.” (citation omitted)); Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair
Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 450 (2008) (“Although in
some tension with the notion of the Romantic author at the center of U.S. copyright law who creates ‘original’ works, the borrower-as-creator has been a constant presence in intellectual creation, both as a matter of historical description
and as a central figure in copyright law fair use commentary.” (citation omitted));
H. Brian Holland, Social Semiotics in the Fair Use Analysis, 24 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 335, 337 (2011) (“[Arguing] for an expansion of fair use based on social
semiotic theory, rather than on theories of authorship or rights of autonomy of
subsequent authors.”).
2. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (listing criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research as examples of fair uses); Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
3. For an example of a suggested method employing no less than seven separate
tests to capture categories of appropriation art entitled to fair use, see Eric D.
Gorman, Comment, Appropriate Testing & Resolution: How to Determine
Whether Appropriation Art Is Transformative “Fair Use” or Merely an Unauthorized Derivative?, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 289 (2012).
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a tailored application of the fair use defense, much like parody.4 Specifically, this Part argues that appropriative use is sufficiently embedded in historical practice that it should, like parody, be viewed as
transformative per se and socially beneficial. In addition, like parody,
it should be viewed as possessing a valid claim to the need for unauthorized copying that frees it from having to “justif[y] . . . the very act
of borrowing.”5 Part IV builds on Professor Laura Heymann’s viewerbased approach to transformative use to suggest a method for determining whether a particular use is appropriative and how much of the
borrowed work may presumptively be copied. Part V summarizes the
suggested approach for appropriative fair use and evaluates how it
may be limited by other case-specific factors. Part VI surveys recent
case law to demonstrate why this approach is preferable to the current
situation. Finally, Part VII applies this suggested framework for appropriative use to the work of appropriation artist Richard Prince.
II. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE AND CAMPBELL
From the earliest days of copyright protection, courts have recognized that there are instances in which the denial of unauthorized
copying may inhibit desirable activities. Thus, under the Statute of
Anne, English courts allowed unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted works in abridgments.6 This recognition has developed into a
judicially created exception to copyright protection, dating back in
American law to Justice Story7 and now codified in Section 107 of the
Copyright Act of 19768: the fair use doctrine. Section 107 demon4. This is not the first publication to suggest a fair use analysis for appropriation art
that borrows from parody. See E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A
Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1518 (1993) (“Just
as a specialized branch of fair use has evolved to handle the unique concerns
raised by parodies, a fair use standard that adequately addresses the issues inherent in the appropriation of images is possible.”).
5. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.
6. Id. at 576.
7. See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 618–19 (D. Mass. 1845); Folsom v. Marsh, 9
F. Cas. 342, 345, 348 (D. Mass. 1841); Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (D.
Mass. 1839).
8. That section provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
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strates the legislative intent that courts continue to develop fair use
through common law,9 adapting the doctrine as necessary to preserve
the “Progress of . . . useful Arts.”10 Section 107 also sets out a nonexclusive, four-factor test to assist courts in determining whether a use
is fair: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the reproduced
portion of the borrowed work; and (4) the effect of the borrowing on the
market for the borrowed work.11
Historically, courts have considered the fourth factor “the single
most important element of fair use.”12 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,13 however, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the significance of the first factor by asking whether the work in question was
transformative:
The central purpose of [the first factor] investigation is to see, in Justice
Story’s words, whether the new work merely “supersede[s] the objects” of the
original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is
“transformative.” Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such
works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing
space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.14

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair
use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
“Congress meant § 107 ‘to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way’ and intended that courts continue the
common-law tradition of fair use adjudication.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975)).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
Id. at 579 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9
F. Cas. 342, 345, 348 (D. Mass. 1841); then quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)). Judge Leval described
transformative use this way:
If . . . the secondary use adds value to the original—if the quoted matter
is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information,
new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type
of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment
of society.
Id. at 1111.
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In other words, the Court recognized that the use of preexisting works
in a manner that creates new artistic expression through the “transformation” of the earlier work is of a kind that copyright law has an
interest in preserving, and so is one to which the fair use defense
should be available.15 Additionally, the transformative quality of a
use acts as a sliding scale, giving the court guidance as to what extent
other factors must support the finding of the use as fair.16
Campbell is also significant as the first Supreme Court opinion to
deal squarely with parody under the fair use defense.17 The dispute
centered on the hip-hop group 2 Live Crew’s parodic take on Roy
Orbison and William Dees’s hit Oh, Pretty Woman.18 In holding unanimously that 2 Live Crew’s parody was fair use, the Court stated that
“parody has an obvious claim to transformative value” and “can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the
process, creating a new one.”19 It concluded that parody, as a category,
is eligible for fair use.20
Giving parody a per se claim to transformative value begs the
question of which works are to be given that designation. On this
point, the Court wrote:
For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions, and the heart of
any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part,
comments on that author’s works. If, on the contrary, the commentary has no
critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which
the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in
working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s
work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the
extent of its commerciality, loom larger. Parody needs to mimic an original to
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 572–73.
Id. at 579.
This language, like Campbell’s shift in emphasis from the fourth to the first fair
use factor, presents a move away from an economic rationale for fair use protection—i.e., the unavailability of licensing as an alternative to unauthorized copying—and instead focuses on the social benefit parody provides. This is a break
from those who distinguish parody from other uses by the likelihood that the
targets of parodies would be unwilling to license their work to prospective lampooners. As pointed out in William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and
Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 21–22
(2000), this unwillingness increases transaction costs, which increase with parody, and further may prevent Coasian bargaining between the copyright holder
and the prospective parodist. See also Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair
Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 72 (1992) (“Only if the parodist is seeking to ridicule
the original work is a market transaction infeasible and an involuntary taking
therefore justifiable . . . .”). Campbell did find this aspect of parody relevant
under the fourth factor, observing that targets of parody are not likely to license
their works to be targeted, which “removes such uses from the very notion of a
potential licensing market.” 510 U.S. at 592.
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make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or
collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet
and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.21

Restated, satire does not target a particular work, but rather, targets
some set of prevailing traits of society, so it could achieve its objectives
without borrowing the copyrighted expression of another.22 Because
such borrowing is not necessary for a work to be satire, it must be
separately justified. In determining whether 2 Live Crew’s cover was
in fact parody, rather than satire, the Court stated that “[t]he threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a
parodic character may reasonably be perceived.”23 Once the Court detected such a “parodic element,” it stated that a further assessment
should be made of whether that element “is slight or great” in order to
determine whether, under the third factor, the extent of copying is
small or extensive in relation.24
In discussing the third fair use factor, which evaluates how much
of the borrowed work has been copied, Campbell noted that “the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of
the use.”25 Looking to the “persuasiveness of a parodist’s justification
for the particular copying done,”26 the Court adopted the “conjure up”
test:
Parody presents a difficult case. Parody’s humor, or in any event its comment,
necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its object through distorted
imitation. Its art lies in the tension between a known original and its parodic
twin. When parody takes aim at a particular original work, the parody must
be able to “conjure up” at least enough of that original to make the object of its
critical wit recognizable. What makes for this recognition is quotation of the
original’s most distinctive or memorable features, which the parodist can be
sure the audience will know. Once enough has been taken to assure identification, how much more is reasonable will depend, say, on the extent to which the
song’s overriding purpose and character is to parody the original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve as a market substitute for the
original.27
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 581 n.15.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 582 n.16.
Id. at 586–87.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 588 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court here followed earlier cases that
indicated the amount needed to conjure up the original was a floor rather than a
ceiling. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438–39 (9th Cir. 1986); Elsmere
Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (“A parody is
entitled at least to ‘conjure up’ the original. Even more extensive use would still
be fair use, provided the parody builds upon the original, using the original as a
known element of modern culture and contributing something new for humorous
effect or commentary.”); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 137 F.
Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Cal. 1955). This is how the Second Circuit has continued to
describe the test. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
law does not require that the secondary artist may take no more than is neces-

2021] APPROPRIATIVE FAIR USE: SUGGESTED APPROACH 703
Parody is the act of critically aping a particular work, and such mimicry would not be possible if the parody could not reproduce some aspects of its target.28
Under Campbell, then, for a parodic work to claim that its unauthorized use of another copyrighted work is a fair use, it must first
meet some threshold showing that it does indeed contain a parodic
element.29 Once that showing is made, the defendant no longer needs
to make a case-specific justification for the need to make use of the
borrowed work. Rather, the justification is already provided by virtue
of it being parody. The parodist is then permitted to copy enough to
conjure up the target work. Beyond this, some justification must be
made, taking into consideration whether the extent of use is great or
small in relation to the magnitude of the parodic element.30
This Article argues that appropriation art should also be viewed as
subject to a tailored application of the fair use defense and that Campbell’s approach to parody under the fair use inquiry provides a workable roadmap for that application.31 As the next Part explains,
appropriation for artistic purposes, like parody, has an “obvious” claim
to transformative value. Also, like parody, appropriation art must, by
definition, quote an earlier work and so should be entitled to some
degree of borrowing. Part IV will explore how this inquiry could be
molded to the particular features of appropriative use.

28.
29.
30.
31.

sary. . . . The secondary use ‘must be [permitted] to “conjure up” at least enough of
the original’ to fulfill its transformative purpose.” (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at
588)). Subsequent circuit opinions sometimes describe the “conjure up” idea differently as a limit. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th
Cir. 2002) (“[T]he parodist must not take more from the original than is necessary
to conjure it up and thus make clear to the audience that his work is indeed a
parody.” (emphasis added)); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109
F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997) (“This court has adopted the ‘conjure up’ test
where the parodist is permitted a fair use of a copyrighted work if it takes no
more than is necessary to ‘recall’ or ‘conjure up’ the object of his parody.” (emphasis added)).
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588 (citations omitted).
Id. at 581.
Id. at 587–89.
See Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433 (2008), for an
argument that the fair use inquiry should be tailored to the various factual contexts in which it arises. See also E. Kenly Ames, supra note 4, at 1475–76 (arguing that since “art created from existing imagery” is a “form of criticism and
comment,” it should be protected by copyright under the fair use defense, “modified to take account of the unique constraints and attributes of the visual
arts . . . .”).
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III. APPROPRIATIVE USE IN ART HISTORY
Appropriation art takes as its dominant and defining strategy the
intentional use of preexisting works.32 Although the moniker may be
relatively new, the strategy is not. The history and social benefit of
appropriation in the arts are manifest and widespread. Mediums from
literature (T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land and James Joyce’s Ulysses) to
music (most major twentieth-century American styles from jazz and
blues to rock and hip hop) and the visual arts, owe their development
and, in some cases, existence to the use of borrowed expression in collage.33 This is not to say that all unauthorized use is therefore socially
beneficial. But, the recognition of the positive effect appropriation has
on society applies with special force to the pointed, strategic use of
appropriation as the defining element of an artistic practice. Appropriation art is such a practice and one whose influence on the progress of
the arts can be traced back to at least the mid-nineteenth century.
A.

Appropriation as a Strategy in Art History

Édouard Manet’s 1863 painting Olympia,34 displayed at the Salon
in Paris in 1865, is widely described as among the first and most important “modern” paintings.35 Its modernity stems from its critical
posture, which itself stems from its quotation of another work.36 The
painting is essentially a reproduction of Titian’s 1538 painting Venus
of Urbino,37 which is itself a reproduction of Giorgione’s Sleeping Venus of 1508–1510.38 But the inviting, graceful figure of the earlier
work is replaced in Olympia with the defiant gaze and guarded posture of a Parisian prostitute.
32. The Museum of Modern Art defines appropriation in the visual arts as “the intentional borrowing, copying, and alteration of preexisting images, objects, and
ideas.” Glossary of Art Terms, MOMA LEARNING, https://www.moma.org/learn/
_learning/glossary [https://perma.unl.edu/9A5B-6KCT] (last visited Aug. 12,
2020).
33. See, e.g., Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf Kuenzli, I Collage, Therefore I Am, in CUTTING ACROSS MEDIA: APPROPRIATION ART, INTERVENTIONIST COLLAGE, AND COPYRIGHT LAW 1, 1 (Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf Kuenzli eds., 2011).
34. See infra Appendix.
35. H.H. ARNASON, HISTORY OF MODERN ART: PAINTING, SCULPTURE, ARCHITECTURE
26 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1977); ALAN BOWNESS, MODERN EUROPEAN ART 15–16
(1977).
36. ARNASON, supra note 35, at 26. Reproducing earlier works and recasting them in
a modern setting was a favorite tactic of Manet’s. Compare Manet’s Le Déjeuner
sur l’herbe (1863), with Marcantonio Raimondi’s The Judgment of Paris (1520),
and Giorgione’s The Pastoral Concert (1510); also compare Manet’s The Execution
of the Emperor Maximillian (1867), with Francisco Goya’s The Third of May,
1808 (1814).
37. See infra Appendix.
38. See infra Appendix.
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The effect of the painting is to evoke a set of ideas through pointed
use of the earlier piece. Titian’s Venus of Urbino expresses the idea of
beauty and grace personified in the form of the female nude—the sensuous Venus Naturalis.39 Manet, however, recontextualizes this idea,
transforming it into a prevailing notion of art to be held up to the light
and examined. One might remark that Manet did not need to quote
Titian’s work specifically. He could have evoked those ideas by use of a
generic image of a classical female nude. But, of course, it is the
viewer’s familiarity with Titian’s work that gives Olympia conceptual
bite, and it is Titian’s authoritative reputation that lends the reference authenticity and impact. The viewer is supposed to be shocked by
the substitution, and it is the desecration of something the viewer
knows specifically that gives the painting its effect.
This practice of pointed borrowing was developed by Marcel
Duchamp, most famously in his 1917 work Fountain,40 which consists
solely of a porcelain urinal signed by the artist under the pseudonym
R. Mutt. The use of the urinal—a “readymade”—challenges the viewer
to explore questions about the relationship between an artist and his
work, and the artist’s role in society. The urinal—an ostensibly unlovely, masculine, mass-produced object—operates as a bundle of
ideas upended by the conspicuous signature (is it a piece of art?), the
placement of the urinal on its back (giving it a decidedly feminine aspect), and the presence of such an object in an art gallery (not so unlovely after all?). In particular, Fountain emphasizes the
transformative effect context can have on a piece. As with Olympia,
Duchamp’s use of readymades depends upon the associations the
viewer has with the object. Fountain has itself been borrowed as conceptual raw material in Sherrie Levine’s Fountain (After Duchamp:
1).41
Appropriation of forms and images appears too in the Pop Art
movement of the mid-twentieth century. Among the most well-known
examples is Andy Warhol’s repeated use of an image of Marilyn
Monroe in Marilyn Diptych.42 Making ample appropriative use of a
film still of Monroe, Marilyn Diptych takes the work not to reuse it on
its own terms but as the locus of a complicated interrelation of ideas—
fame, sex, idolatry, consumerism, the ubiquity of images—presented
in a diptych, the familiar format of religious, devotional art. The
haunting specter of the repeated, identical faces diminishing with
each iteration creates meaning not attributable to the source work.
Claes Oldenburg’s transformation of the mundane into a “modern Co39. KENNETH CLARK, THE NUDE: A STUDY IN IDEAL FORM 124–30 (1956).
40. See infra Appendix.
41. SAM HUNTER & JOHN JACOBUS, MODERN ART 416 (3d ed. 1992); see infra
Appendix.
42. See infra Appendix.
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lossus of Rhodes” in Clothespin,43 presents yet another tack Pop Art
has taken in its appropriative course.44
Appropriative use often results from the artist’s desire to comment
directly on art history itself, as in Olympia and Fountain (After
Duchamp:1). A similar use can be seen in Norman Rockwell’s 1961
painting The Connoisseur,45 which makes use of the telltale style of
the famous abstract expressionist Jackson Pollock. More recently, new
generations of artists have continued to develop this vein of artistic
practice. A notable example is Yasumasa Morimura, who has made a
career of substituting figures from well-known pieces with his own visage, perhaps his most famous work being an appropriation of Olympia
in Portrait (Futago).46
What these works share is an artistic stratagem with a well-established pedigree: the borrowing of an earlier work or object as a component—possibly the only component—of the new work.47 Olympia,
which dates back 150 years, and arguably even Titian’s appropriation
of Giorgione’s Sleeping Venus, which dates back nearly 480 years,48 fit
within the appropriation art movement as described by the Second
Circuit: “This tradition defines its efforts as follows: when the artist
finishes his work, the meaning of the original object has been extracted and an entirely new meaning set in its place.”49 Like parody,
appropriative use, through its method, creates new meaning from old
and so “can provide social benefit.”50 As a distinct and recognizable
43. See infra Appendix.
44. See ROBERT HUGHES, THE SHOCK OF THE NEW 359 (1980) (“What could be more
ordinary than a clothes-pin?”). It is the viewer’s connection with Oldenburg’s portrayal of everyday objects as ordinary and unremarkable that gives their metamorphosis into a “modern Colossus of Rhodes” artistic efficacy. Id. For a
discussion of the implication of borrowing objects protected by trademark, such
as Andy Warhol’s famous image of the Campbell’s soup can, see John Carlin,
Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 113–17 (1988).
45. See infra Appendix.
46. See infra Appendix. “Futago” is Japanese for “twin.”
47. See generally Darren Hudson Hick, Appropriation and Transformation, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1155, 1190–91 (2013) (proposing fair use
protection to identical copies of preexisting works where the new copy is used to
express a different idea than that expressed in the preexisting work, but to deny
the newer work copyright protection as original expression).
48. Justice Story may have placed the practice back further yet:
Virgil borrowed much from Homer; Bacon drew from earlier as well as
contemporary minds; Coke exhausted all the known learning of his profession; and even Shakespeare and Milton, so justly and proudly our
boast as the brightest originals would be found to have gathered much
from the abundant stores of current knowledge and classical studies in
their days.
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (D. Mass. 1845).
49. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992).
50. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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strain of artistic endeavor that offers the social benefit the I.P. Clause
protects, and as one that depends on borrowing for its existence, appropriation too should be viewed as a mode of artistic expression that
is inherently transformative and entitled to have the first fair use factor under Section 107 weigh in its favor.
B.

The Necessity of Borrowing for Appropriative Use

In Campbell, the Supreme Court described the transformative nature of parody, which, “[l]ike less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, . . . can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier
work, and, in the process, creat[e] a new one.”51 Furthermore,
“[p]arody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has
some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’)
imagination.”52 This, of course, is far from recognizing that parody is
per se fair use, or even presumptively fair use.53 What this does recognize, however, is that under the first Section 107 factor, parody, which
“has an obvious claim to transformative value,” must make some use
of the target work in order to exist as a mode of artistic expression.54
As with Campbell’s treatment of parody, appropriative use should
also be given the benefit of being free from the need to justify the act of
borrowing. Before explaining this position, an initial clarification: the
first factor under Section 107 references both the purpose and the
character of the use.55 While parody is thought of, and distinguished
from other kinds of work such as satire, by its purpose—that is,
whether the artist intends to comment or criticize upon a particular
work or something else—appropriation in the arts may be better
thought of as a use of a particular character. As illustrated by the examples of works above, appropriation can be deployed to any number
of ends: subversion, celebration, investigation, criticism, or play.
What distinguishes these works, rather than a common purpose, is
a characteristic method that lays legitimate claim to a need to borrow.56 That claim arises from the conceptual efficiency and impact
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 580–81.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 579. Of course, “parody, like any other use, has to work its way through the
relevant factors, and be judged case by case, in light of the relevant ends
of . . . copyright law.” Id. at 581.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
56. It is true that very often appropriation works are described, as Blanch described
Niagara, as satirical. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2006) (“ ‘Niagara’ . . . may be better characterized . . . as satire . . . .”). Perhaps it could be
argued that appropriation art is better regarded as a subset of satire, but, although such a description may often (but not always) be accurate, satire cannot
be said to be a defining aspect of appropriation art. Artist Sheppard Fairey’s
Hope poster of then-presidential candidate Barack Obama may well fall within
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achieved by the appropriative use. Rather than merely use the expression of the borrowed work “to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in
working up something fresh,”57 appropriation art uses the borrowed
expression as the language of collective experience and culture which
serves as shorthand for a set of complex and interrelated ideas. The
reuse, modification, or recontextualization of the borrowed work creates new meaning, representing ideas not expressed in the original
work. The ideas evoked by appropriative use come both intrinsically
from within the borrowed piece and extrinsically from the cultural
and critical context in which it is situated. Such extrinsic meaning
might include the viewer’s reading of and association with the borrowed work; the social and historical context of the borrowed work;
the artist’s overall use of the borrowed work in the piece;58 the extent
to which the borrowed work may function as a symbol, very often of
some prevailing social norm or institution; and the placement of the
work into the particular context in which it is displayed.
Thus, appropriative use relies on the viewers’ familiarity with the
borrowed work—either their specific knowledge of the work itself or
their familiarity with the complex intersection of ideas evoked by the
work. Olympia, for example, may be said to challenge the Parisian
Salon, and it does so by using appropriation in a manner that depends
on the viewer’s preexisting knowledge of Titian’s work and its accompanying bundle of associations. The fair-skinned, reposed figure elicits
for the viewer ideas of classical beauty, but upon noticing the true
identity of the figure, the expressed idea transforms into a hegemony
of status and taste.
Duchamp’s Fountain, Warhol’s Marilyn Diptych, or Claes Oldenberg’s Clothespin use familiar forms to invoke the visual lingua franca
of modern twentieth-century life. In this sense, the borrowed works
are a reference for the viewer—forms and aesthetics that are a “fact”
of everyday living. This is precisely the sense in which appropriation
artist Jeff Koons described his use of a borrowed image in Blanch v.
Koons. The artist was sued for infringement of an advertisement photograph from Allure magazine of a woman’s lower legs and sandaled
feet, which he incorporated into a collage titled Niagara.59 Koons
stated:
the ambit of appropriative use as described in this paper, but it would be difficult
to describe Fairey’s use of the image in that piece as satirical.
57. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
58. As Justice Story put it in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (D. Mass. 1841): “In
some cases, a considerable portion of the materials of the original work may be
fused, if I may use such an expression, into another work, so as to be undistinguishable in the mass of the latter, which has other professed and obvious objects, and cannot fairly be treated as a piracy . . . .”
59. See infra Appendix.
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The ubiquity of the photograph is central to my message. The photograph is
typical of a certain style of mass communication. Images almost identical to
them can be found in almost any glossy magazine, as well as in other media.
To me, the legs depicted in the Allure photograph are a fact in the world,
something that everyone experiences constantly; they are not anyone’s legs in
particular.60

Perhaps Koons might have created his own set of photographed legs
and feet. To this he responds: “By using an existing image, I also ensure a certain authenticity or veracity that enhances my commentary—it is the difference between quoting and paraphrasing—and
ensure that the viewer will understand what I am referring to.”61
To require Koons to accomplish these effects—creating multiple
layers of complex ideas, associations, or immediately graspable facts
of everyday life in a world replete with images and consumption—
without using forms familiar to the viewer as a means of efficiency
and impact (as a shorthand that allows the artist to evoke particular
concepts in the mind of the viewer), would be like requiring a book
reviewer to critique a novel without quoting its text. It could, technically, be attempted, but the result would effectively eviscerate the impact of the new work so as to nullify its contribution to the progress of
the arts. Furthermore, the question of how effectively an artist could
communicate the idea without appropriation openly invites judges
into a quagmire of subjectivity and taste that is the provenance of the
artist.62 As discussed below, accepting the need for appropriative use
shifts the inquiry away from the taste of the judge.
IV. WHAT IS APPROPRIATION ART AND WHAT IS IT
ENTITLED TO TAKE? A VIEWER-BASED APPROACH
If copyright law were to consider appropriation art categorically
entitled to claim transformative use, and some amount of unjustified
borrowing may be attendant to that claim, then at least two inquiries
will preoccupy litigants and courts: (1) what art comes within the appropriation category, and (2) how much unjustified borrowing may it
claim? In a 2008 law review article, Professor Laura Heymann suggested a viewer-centric approach to the transformativeness inquiry
which creates a useful model for providing evidentiary sources to answer both of these questions.63 She suggested an inquiry that hews
closer to the meaning of “transformative” laid out in Judge Leval’s
60. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255.
61. Id.
62. For a discussion of the pitfalls of judicial bias in making aesthetic judgments, see
Liz McKenzie, Comment, Drawing Lines: Addressing Cognitive Bias in Art Appropriation Cases, 20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 83 (2013).
63. Heymann, supra note 1

710

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:697

seminal article,64 which focuses on the addition of meaning rather
than of material.
Heymann points out that when the Court adopted the test in
Campbell, it spoke in terms of added material, rather than added
meaning.65 The Court’s focus on material alteration seems to be an
arbitrary distinction, serving only to give courts some objective indicia
of transformativeness. Courts, by their own admission, should not be
in the position to make aesthetic judgments about artwork.66 This
functional limitation, however, is in tension with the courts’ role in
determining whether a use is transformative. Perhaps it is in recognition of this conflict that courts seek to ease their discomfort by pointing to telltale signs of transformativeness: the artists’ intended (or at
least stated) purpose; the amount of new material added; the presence
of a “message”;67 and the court’s ad hoc determination of whether an
alternate method existed.
Professor Heymann addresses these shortcomings of the transformative inquiry by building on the idea in Roland Barthes’s influential piece The Death of the Author:“[A] text ‘is made of multiple
writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation,’ all centering on the reader,
who is ‘simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the
traces by which the written text is constituted.’ ”68 Although the language of the Copyright Act is tethered to the long-outmoded “ideal of
the Romantic author as the source of creative production,”69 the transformativeness inquiry need not, and should not, be so limited. Following Barthes’s lead, Professor Heymann proposes looking to the viewer,
rather than the artist, to determine how much interpretive, rather
64. See Leval, supra note 14.
65. Id. at 452; see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
66. “As Justice Holmes explained, ‘it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a
work], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
their author spoke.’ ” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582–83
(1994) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251
(1903)).
67. It is particularly unfortunate that an artist’s admission that his use does not contain a “message” may be considered a damning statement. See, e.g., Cariou v.
Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, vacated in part,
714 F.3d 694 (2013). The jesting, playful nature of postmodern art, in particular,
is antithetical to a posited “message,” and it seems more than a little old fashioned, even atavistic, for courts to continue to seek one out as evidence of new
expression. Moreover, this puts artists in the conflicted position of protecting
their liability in a manner at odds with their artistic practice.
68. Heymann, supra note 1, at 446 (quoting Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author,
in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 142 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977)).
69. Id. at 453.
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than purposive, distance a use has achieved.70 Furthermore, this approach recognizes that all uses are transformative to one extent or another.71 Thus, in gauging the interpretive distance achieved, the court
should not be asking whether the distance is sufficient for a finding of
transformativeness. Rather, it should regard any interpretive shift as
necessarily transformative and apply that quantum to the sliding
scale of import lent to other factors such as commercial nature,
amount borrowed, and market impact.72
Just who are these viewers to be consulted in making this finding?
Heymann refers to them as “discursive communities” surrounding a
work.73 In particular, she points to the existence of a separate discursive community as an indication of the likelihood the work has enough
interpretive distance—is transformative “enough”—to weigh in favor
of fair use under the first factor.74 This community would be those
who discuss the work or the artist’s oeuvre.75 Sources of evidence
under this approach would include: critical reception of the work; discussion of the work by members of the surrounding artistic community; expert testimony; statements by the author not motivated by
litigation; and even the courts themselves when stepping in as a “reasonable reader” when other forms of evidence are not available.76
A.

Which Works May Claim Appropriative Fair Use?

The threshold question for a tailored application of fair use to appropriation art is which works may be afforded the benefit of being
deemed appropriation art by the courts? In the context of parody, this
question has turned on a reasonableness standard.77 The Second Circuit, in assessing whether a piece of appropriation art was sufficiently
transformative to be entitled to the fair use defense, adopted a standard similarly based on a reasonable observer.78 Although reference
to a reasonable observer may direct the judge to disregard her per70. Id. at 453–57. For debate on this “anti-intentionalist” shift away from the stated
intentions of the artist and toward the audience, in addition to Professor Heymann’s article, supra note 1, see Adler, supra note 1, at 584–616; Monika Isia
Jasiewicz, Note, “A Dangerous Undertaking”: The Problem of Intentionalism and
Promise of Expert Testimony in Appropriation Art Infringement Cases, 26 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 143 (2014); Ben Picozzi, Note, What’s Wrong with Intentionalism?
Transformative Use, Copyright Law, and Authorship, 126 YALE L.J. 1408 (2017).
71. Heymann, supra note 1, at 455.
72. Id. at 455–56.
73. Id. at 455–57.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (“The threshold
question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived.”).
78. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013).
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sonal taste, the question of just how such an observer may perceive a
work seems little more than guesswork. Artists may find it in their
interest to label their works as appropriation art, even when it would
not be an accurate description; courts must be wary of after-the-fact
explanations of purpose artists give to help their litigation prospects.
Two elements of Professor Heymann’s approach—the shift toward
the viewer in determining transformation in meaning and the recognition of discursive communities as a source of viewer interpretation—
provide a useful and effective basis for the determination of whether a
particular use should fall into the category of “appropriation art.”79
This shift from the artist to the viewer in determining interpretive
distance comports well with the tradition of appropriative use, which
emphatically recognizes the centrality of the viewer—the “interpreter”
whose expectations may be thwarted or whose associations may be the
artist’s conceptual medium. It also gives the courts an evidentiary
source less susceptible to bias, as viewers would not have an interest
in the litigation. Furthermore, because it is the viewers’ interpretation
that appropriation artists manipulate, those viewers are a natural
source for determining whether the artist was engaged in an appropriative use or was merely too lazy to come up with their own expression.
Finally, this allows the court to wash its hands of the fuzzy business of
making this determination for itself, setting it to the familiar task of
weighing evidence, including expert testimony.
By looking to discursive communities, the courts can search for
more reliable indicia than, for example, the artist’s stated purpose.
Instead courts can look to whether a work is considered by viewers to
be appropriation art. Such indicia might include whether the work is
surrounded by critical commentary speaking of the art as appropriative; whether the artist herself is generally regarded by the discursive
community as an appropriation artist; and whether the artist places
her work—both the work in question and other similar works by the
artist—in galleries or other locations consistent with it being appropriation art i.e., whether the “gatekeepers” of the discursive community behave toward the work in a manner consistent with its claim to
being appropriation art. If the discursive community supports a finding that the work is appropriation art, this means that the borrowing
work should be transformative as a matter of law.
By granting that all appropriation art is transformative per se and
has a claim to some use of its appropriated work, the courts would
shift their focus from defendants’ after-the-fact and interested insistence on the transformative virtues of their work to the legitimacy of
the defendants’ claims that they make appropriation art. The benefit
of this shift is that while the former leaves judges potentially subject
79. Heymann, supra note 1, at 466.

2021] APPROPRIATIVE FAIR USE: SUGGESTED APPROACH 713
to their own perception of indicia of transformativeness and the selfinterested statements of the artist, the latter approach leaves open
the possibility of a greater array of objective evidentiary sources. In
determining whether a piece of art is appropriation art, the court can
and should look to the community of artists, viewers, and critics surrounding both the particular work and the artist’s overall career.
While their views may not be any less subjective than the judge’s, the
risk of personal idiosyncrasies skewing the result is spread over a
larger number of uninterested observers who may have greater familiarity with the works at issue.
B.

Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in
Relation to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole

Just as parody is granted a certain amount of justification-free borrowing because of its need to conjure up the target work, use of an
appropriative character also must evoke enough of the borrowed piece
to achieve its effect. However, because appropriative use is more correctly described as a characteristic use, rather than purposive, the ad
hoc determination in each case ought to take account of the particular
effect the appropriative use achieves. That is, the simple “conjure up”
formula for parody does not translate well to the myriad uses toward
which appropriative use may be put. Here again, Professor Heymann’s
turn toward the perspective of the audience provides a useful starting
point. Appropriative use relies on the viewer’s response to the referenced work, and at least enough of the borrowed work must be used to
permit this process to occur. This Article suggests a three-tier approach based on the connection between the viewer and the appropriated work, where each tier represents an appropriative use for which
a greater or lesser extent of borrowing is presumptively needed.
The first tier would allow for the greatest extent of borrowing
where the target work is being used because viewers recognize the
work itself. For example, Morimura’s works are exclusively verbatim
reproductions of famous pieces of art with pointed substitutions. Portrait (Futago) achieves its expression by the substitution of Morimura
for the female figure in Olympia, the cartoon-cat cutout, the male servant, the deliberative grip by the right hand, the golden-crane-strewn
coverlet, and the use of photography.80 Similarly, Levine’s Fountain
(After Duchamp) makes use of Duchamp’s Fountain with the substitution of the porcelain finish with bronze, reminiscent of Ducahmp’s contemporary Constantin Brâncuşi, and the removal of Duchamp’s
brazen, pseudonymous signature.81 Because each alteration to the
original in these pieces is considered intentional, the use of anything
80. See infra Appendix.
81. See infra Appendix.
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less than the entire piece would impede the appropriative use. Viewers may take the absence of any part of the appropriated work as
meaningful. This use may still be limited to some extent by the risk of
market substitution by the appropriating work, but in this instance
the argument for appropriating the entire work waxes to its strongest
position in relation to that risk.
The second tier would encompass works that borrow not for the
viewer’s familiarity with the work itself but for some potent, specific
cultural icon or symbol with which the viewer is familiar. For example, the viewer of Marilyn Diptych may not be specifically aware of the
exact film still Warhol appropriated from, but the image is of a kind—
the aforementioned “fact” of life in contemporary America—that
evokes associations the artist may want to explore.82 Koons’s use of
the sandaled feet in Niagara is similarly used to evoke a particular
association of prosaic consumerism.83 Here, where the use of the earlier work draws less on the viewer’s particular familiarity with the
specific work and more on the associations it evokes, the argument for
use of the entire piece is weaker. The artist ought to be able to borrow
at least enough expression that the viewer can recognize the cultural
symbol, but, as with parody, “[o]nce enough has been taken to assure
identification,”84 the extent of further borrowing allowed may be more
greatly constrained by countervailing factors.
The third tier would encompass uses that do not rely on the
viewer’s recognition of the specific work or of a cultural icon or symbol
and its related associations. An example of such a third-tier use is
Richard Prince’s work, Graduation, discussed in more detail in Part
VI.85 The use of the borrowed work in Graduation does not appear to
center on the viewer’s knowledge of the particular piece or even the
viewer’s specific associations with Rastafarianism.86 Prince’s own testimony refers to a desire to make pieces that are “fantastic,” “absolutely hip,” and “post-apocalyptic.”87 In this situation, the artist may
simply be using the borrowed work to evoke a nonspecific, broad quality—a mood or an air. Here, the work should not be presumptively
82. See infra Appendix.
83. When discussing his appropriation of a postcard of puppies for a sculpture, Koons
“viewed the picture as part of mass culture—‘resting in the collective sub-consciousness of people regardless of whether the card had actually ever been seen
by such people.’ ” Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992); see infra
Appendix.
84. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994).
85. See infra Appendix.
86. This could be contested. Prince himself described the image as part of an effort
“to create beautiful artworks which related to musical themes and to a post-apocalyptic screenplay he was writing which featured a reggae band.” Cariou v.
Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, vacated in part,
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
87. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707.
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allowed to use a certain amount of an earlier work. Instead, the entire
extent of borrowing should turn on a typical analysis: the risk of market substitution, commerciality, and other factors considered in relation to the degree to which the new work transforms the old.88 This is
because the conceptual efficiency of appropriation seems absent in
this circumstance. Titian’s Venus of Urbino or Marilyn Monroe’s visage conjure up a universe of interrelated concepts grounded in history
and society and have no comparably impactful substitutes. Prince’s
use of Yes Rasta as a sort of set design, by contrast, lacks this constraint; it is not difficult to imagine practical alternatives open to the
artist, such as creating a similar effect himself or choosing from an
array of similar images to license. Here, the risk that the artist
“avoided the drudgery in working up something fresh” appears most
salient and so the limiting effect of other factors should loom largest.
V. A SUMMARY OF APPROPRIATIVE FAIR USE AND ITS
LIMITATION BY THE SECTION 107 FACTORS
The specialized appropriative fair use inquiry as set forth in this
Article would begin with a threshold inquiry into whether it ought to
be applied to the work in question. The defendant would, at the outset,
have the burden of presenting evidence that the work is appropriation
art. Rather than use Campbell’s reasonableness test for parody or
Cariou’s reasonable observer test for appropriative transformation,89
the defendant would instead be required to make an evidentiary showing that the work is considered appropriation art by discursive communities. If the art in question, or the artist herself, does not have a
surrounding discursive community, expert testimony may be used to
plug the gap. If the defendant is successful in meeting this threshold
showing, the work will be considered transformative.
Additionally, the work may be entitled to a certain amount of use
of the borrowed work as a floor.90 In the case of appropriation art that
presents an earlier work which the viewer is presumed to know, this
entitlement extends to the entire work. Where instead the work appropriates a cultural symbol or icon that generates associated ideas in
the viewer, the “conjure up” analog is most apt. More use beyond that
necessary to conjure up the symbol or icon must be justified under the
specific facts of the case. Finally, when the work appropriates in such
a way as to supply an effect on the viewer that is vague and not tied to
the earlier work itself or an identifiable symbol or icon known to the
88. This does not mean that Prince loses, but simply that his required showing for
the fair use defense is greater.
89. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 27 (discussing whether the conjure-up test is a floor or a ceiling).
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viewer, the artist must justify any extent of borrowing as they would
in a normal third-factor fair use inquiry.
Beyond these specialized aspects of an appropriative fair use inquiry, the court will of course have to apply the other statutory factors
under Section 107. Here too, the courts’ treatment of parody under the
other factors can provide guidance on how those factors would apply to
appropriation art. That is, appropriative use should “work its way
through the relevant factors, and be judged case by case, in light of the
ends of copyright law.”91
A.

The Purpose and Character of the Use

As already described, appropriation art should be seen, like parody, as eligible for fair use protection because of its transformative
nature and its benefit to society. Additionally, it should be seen as
providing its own justification for the act of borrowing. This is not to
say, however, that all appropriative uses are equally transformative,
and, under the viewer-based approach advocated by Professor Heymann, the court should still engage in some analysis as to the interpretive distance achieved by the use. The greater the distance, under
Campbell, the less heavily other considerations should weigh.
Courts have treated the commercial nature of a use as weighing
against a finding of fairness under the first factor. Campbell eliminated this as a categorical presumption, noting that “[i]f, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the
presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in
the preamble paragraph of § 107.”92 This argument applies equally to
appropriation art. Artists must sell their work to engage in their profession, and so a presumption against fair use because the work is
being sold would essentially eliminate all appropriation art from eligibility for fair use. Nonetheless, the extent to which the work is created
purely as a commercial venture, as opposed to furthering the arts
through exhibition and participation in discursive communities, may
weigh against a finding of appropriative fair use.
B.

The Nature of the Copyrighted Work

This factor has been given force by the courts through recognition
of creative works thought to be “closer to the core of intended copyright protection,” the borrowing of which is less likely to be found a
fair use.93 Campbell noted, however, that the fact that a copied work
is “within the core of copyright’s protective purposes” is not “ever
likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep from the infring91. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994).
92. Id. at 584.
93. Id. at 586.
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ing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.”94
As illustrated by the pieces described above, appropriation art
rarely, if ever, makes use of factual works to achieve its effects. The
ideas and associations evoked by appropriative use are intimately connected to the cultural artifacts created and perpetuated by the creative arts. The images that mediate the conception and propagation of
ideas in the collective consciousness—the field in which appropriation
art primarily operates—are nearly exclusively created and known i.e.,
published. This factor, therefore, would be of little use in the typical
case of appropriative fair use.
C.

The Effect of the Use upon the Potential Market for or
Value of the Copyrighted Work

The effect of the use on the market of the borrowed work has often,
though not uniformly, been described as the most important of the
Section 107 factors.95 The relevance of this factor lies in the following
generally accepted distinction:
[C]opying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense that
nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a substitute
for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs or
screws), or for derivative works from the copyrighted work, is not fair use.96

This general distinction ties in with the third factor’s treatment of
parody and explains why parody is allowed at least enough borrowing
to conjure up the target work:
The distinction is implicit in the proposition . . . that the parodist must not
take more from the original than is necessary to conjure it up and thus make
clear to the audience that his work is indeed a parody. If he takes much more,
he may begin to attract the audience away from the work parodied . . . by
providing a substitute for it.97

Thus, the risk of market substitution takes on greater import once the
amount of expression the parody needs to make use of has been taken.
Unlike parody, however, the amount necessary to borrow for an
appropriative use must be seen as case-specific for the particular purpose to which that use is put—here it should be viewed in the threetier framework discussed above. As with Morimura’s work,98 sometimes the appropriative use must borrow the entire work. While this
would weigh against a finding of fair use by increasing the risk of substitution, Morimura’s claim to a need to borrow the entire work should
take primacy. In the second tier, the risk of substitution should not
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nat’l Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)
(“This last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”).
96. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l. Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 518 (emphasis added).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 80–81.
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begin to weigh against a fair use finding until enough has been taken
for the viewer to recognize the cultural icon or symbol, and, even then,
the transformativeness of the work may counteract such a risk. With
works that borrow for nonspecific associations, such as Graduation,
the extent of borrowing must be justified and weighed against that
risk as a whole.
In addition, the nature of the art market must be taken into account. The value of art to many collectors is largely the result of the
artist who created it. It defies belief to say that Portrait (Futago)
would ever be seen by viewers or purchasers as a substitute for Olympia.99 The market for each of these works is filled with purchasers—
art collectors—who know what they are looking at. The differences
between the two works are enormous in terms of the paintings themselves, the “period” they represent, and the critiques they make. The
particular market at issue would need to be evaluated in each case.
VI. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE, PARODY, AND
APPROPRIATION ART
The appropriative fair use framework set forth in this Article
would give courts some guidance in applying the fair use defense to
appropriation art while limiting their need to wander into the realm of
aesthetic judgments. As the series of cases described below illustrates,
this is an improvement over the current state of fair use law.
A.

Rogers v. Koons

The first set of cases to apply the fair use inquiry to appropriation
art was a trilogy of pre-Campbell copyright infringement suits leveled
against sculptor Jeff Koons in the early 1990s following an exhibition
of his works.100 Titled “The Banality Show,” the exhibit featured caricaturized sculptures of figures, some exact copies of copyrighted
works.101 The most notable of the three cases, Rogers v. Koons, arose
from Koons’s sculpture titled String of Puppies, a reproduction of Rogers’s photograph of a smiling, seated couple embracing a gaggle of
99. See infra Appendix.
100. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York followed the Second Circuit’s lead in two subsequent decisions. United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), centered on Koons’s reproduction, in sculptural form, of Odie the
dog from the Garfield comic strip. The issue of a sculptural reproduction of a
copyrighted image—this time a depiction of some children pushing a large hog—
arose again in Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993).
101. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304–05.
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German Shepard puppies.102 The Second Circuit affirmed the trial
court’s finding of liability against Koons.103
Rogers highlights the need for a specialized category of fair use for
appropriation apart from parody. Koons did make an effort to explain
the vein of artistic practice he was a part of. As the court explained:
We must analyze therefore whether “String of Puppies” is properly considered
a comment on or criticism of the photograph “Puppies.” Koons argues that his
sculpture is a satire or parody of society at large. He insists that “String of
Puppies” is a fair social criticism and asserts to support that proposition that
he belongs to the school of American artists who believe the mass production
of commodities and media images has caused a deterioration in the quality of
society, and this artistic tradition of which he is a member proposes through
incorporating these images into works of art to comment critically both on the
incorporated object and the political and economic system that created it.
These themes, Koons states, draw upon the artistic movements of Cubism and
Dadaism, with particular influence attributed to Marcel Duchamp, who in
1913 became the first to incorporate manufactured objects (readymades) into
a work of art, directly influencing Koons’ work and the work of other contemporary American artists. We accept this definition of the objective of this
group of American artists.104

The court, unsurprisingly, found this description of Koons’s art as
outside the scope of parody.105
It observed that “the copied work must be, at least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to conjure up the
original work.”106 It concluded that “[i]f an infringement of copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use solely on the basis of the
infringer’s claim to a higher or different artistic use—without insuring
public awareness of the original work—there would be no practicable
boundary to the fair use defense.”107 Parody, by contrast, makes “the
audience . . . aware that underlying the parody there is an original
and separate expression.”108 Finding it “difficult to discern any parody
of the photograph ‘Puppies’ itself,”109 the court denied Koons the
“more extensive use of the copied work [which] is ordinarily allowed”
in parody.110
Rogers demonstrates that the categories of parody and satire are
poor substitutes for appropriation as an artistic stratagem. Its justification for use lies not in the need to conjure up the borrowed work to
comment upon it but to use the borrowed works as a conceptual medium, a stand-in for a locus of ideas. Neither is appropriation, by defi102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 305; see infra Appendix.
Rogers, 960 F.2d at 314.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nition, a satirical critique of society at large; it can be put to myriad
purposes. What does limit this category is not its purpose but its status as appropriation art. This is a subset of creative expression certainly narrower than the boundless expanse of fair use claimants
Rogers envisioned. In particular, the use of discursive communities to
limit appropriative fair use to appropriation artists should go some
way in alleviating that concern.
Finally, the concern that the use should make the audience aware
of the existence of an underlying expression is addressed by the threetiered approach. The top two tiers focus on appropriative uses that
make use of the viewer’s preexisting familiarity with the borrowed expression. The third tier, in which the viewer’s familiarity is not assumed, deprives the appropriator of any favorable presumption under
the third fair use factor.
B.

Blanch v. Koons

Apparently unthwarted, Koons was back in the courtroom defending his unauthorized use of a copyrighted photograph in Blanch v.
Koons.111 Koons used a photograph of a woman’s sandaled feet from a
magazine advertisement in a collage titled Niagara.112 Being postCampbell, the Second Circuit found there was enough aesthetic alteration to the borrowed photograph for Niagara to be transformative.113
It based this finding on Koons’s professed purpose to use the photograph “as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media.”114 This purpose was “sharply different from
Blanch’s goals in creating [the photograph]” and thus transformative.115 The court also found the use was “substantially transformative,” minimizing the relevance of the work’s commercial nature.116
Because the court regarded Koons’s use as satirical (as opposed to parody), it sought out an independent justification under Campbell—
what it called a “genuine creative rationale”—for Niagara’s appropriative use.117 It found justification in Koons’s own description of his
need to use the photograph: that it is “typical of a certain style of mass
communication” and it conveys that style with “authenticity or veracity.”118 This time Koons’s fair use defense succeeded.119
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
See infra Appendix.
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251–53.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 254 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting NXIVM
Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 2004)).
117. Id. at 255.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 259.
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In considering Koons’s justification for borrowing in Blanch, the
court was careful to state that “[i]t is not . . . our job to judge the
merits of ‘Niagara,’ or of Koons’s approach to art,” and it eschewed
reliance “on our own poorly honed artistic sensibilities.”120 Nevertheless, the court noted that its exclusive reliance on Koons’s own (and by
this point well-trained) testimony “ease[d] our analysis in this
case.”121 It described Koons’s “clear conception of his reasons for using
‘Silk Sandals,’ and his ability to articulate those reasons.”122 One wonders whether the court would have navigated its evaluation of Koons’s
justification in the same way in a case where that justification was
contested. Indeed, when reading the courts’ tone in Rogers and
Blanch, one gets the distinct impression that the analysis of the artist’s justification for borrowing turns as much on its receptiveness to
Koons’s methodology as it does on the artist’s testimony. Courts would
be better served, as suggested here, by focusing more on weighing evidence of viewer impressions and less on their own determinations of
artistic justifications.
This concern is underscored by the Blanch court’s fixation, taken
from Campbell, on Koons’s “purpose” or “objective.”123 This is no doubt
how Campbell and Justice Story have described the kind of transformative expression that entitles new work to copyright protection even
when making use of another work. But the ultimate goal of copyright
is to protect expression and transformations in meaning, or as articulated by Judge Leval, “new insights or understandings.”124 As discussed earlier,125 the notion of message or concrete objectives is one
rejected by many contemporary artists. Nothing in Section 107 or fair
use common law mandates a focus on purpose or objective over the
simple question of whether there is a distinct, new, non-derivative expression. Again, a focus on audience perception and interpretive distance could shed more light on this inquiry, as could a shift to
analyzing the work’s character as appropriation art.
C.

Cariou v. Prince

These difficulties in applying a normal fair use analysis to appropriation art—an inevitable reliance on the court’s own aesthetic judgment and an ill-fitting focus on concepts rejected by some
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 255.
Id. at 255 n.6.
Id. at 255 n.5.
Id. at 252 (“[Koons’s] purposes in using Blanch’s image are sharply different from
Blanch’s goal in creating it.”); id. at 253 (evaluating Koons’s “stated objective”
and “distinct creative or communicative objectives”).
124. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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appropriation artists—are apparent in Cariou v. Prince.126 In Cariou,
noted appropriation artist Richard Prince made use of a number of
photographs by Patrick Cariou in a series of collages.127 Twenty-five
of Prince’s pieces, including James Brown Disco Ball, used only small
portions—the heads or bodies of figures—from Cariou’s Yes Rasta
photograph series.128 A few pieces, such as Graduation, however, borrowed entire works.129 The district court ruled the works infringed on
Cariou’s copyrights.130 The Second Circuit reversed this ruling, holding that the twenty-five collaged pieces were entitled to fair use protection as a matter of law, and remanded the case for consideration of
the remaining five pieces that borrowed entire works.131
The case’s progression from the lower court to the Second Circuit
shows the sort of push and pull of aesthetic judgments by courts that
this Article’s suggested approach is meant to avoid. Whereas the district court—which found Prince’s work was not transformative—concluded Prince’s “purpose in using Cariou’s Rastafarian portraits was
the same as Cariou’s original purpose in taking them,”132 the Second
Circuit found sufficient aesthetic differences to conclude the twentyfive collaged pieces were transformative as a matter of law:
These twenty-five of Prince’s artworks manifest an entirely different aesthetic
from Cariou’s photographs. Where Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed
portraits and landscape photographs depict the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the
other hand, are hectic and provocative. Cariou’s black-and-white photographs
were printed in a 9 1/2? x 12? book. Prince has created collages on canvas that
incorporate color, feature distorted human and other forms and settings, and
measure between ten and nearly a hundred times the size of the photographs.
Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and media are fundamentally different and new compared to the photographs, as is the expressive
nature of Prince’s work.133

Whatever insights such ad hoc critiques of artwork provide, they are a
capricious basis for a legal standard.134
The Second Circuit did attempt to shift away from an intentionalist approach in stating: “What is critical is how the work in question
appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1018 (2013).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 700; see infra Appendix.
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 701; see infra Appendix.
Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 353–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2013).
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712.
Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706.
See id. at 713 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s view that “all the
Court needs to do here to determine transformativeness is view the original work
and the secondary work and, apparently, employ its own artistic judgment”).
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say about a particular piece or body of work.”135 Also positive was the
court’s move away from the misguided insistence that appropriative
use must be pigeonholed into the “commentary” requirement of parody
or satire: “Prince’s work could be transformative even without commenting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and even without Prince’s
stated intention to do so.”136
Where the court fell short, however, was (1) in using its own judgment as to what a “reasonable” observer of art might perceive, and (2)
in remaining bound to aesthetic difference as a criterion of transformativeness. This, incidentally, is the same approach taken in a
more recent case involving, once again, Prince’s appropriation of an
image of a Rastafarian.137 On Prince’s motion to dismiss, the court
found:
Viewing Graham’s Rastafarian Smoking a Joint and Prince’s Untitled sideby-side, it is evident that Prince’s work does not belong to a class of secondary
works that are so aesthetically different from the originals that they can pass
the Second Circuit’s “reasonable viewer” test as a matter of law. Untitled is
certainly no more transformative than the five works in Cariou that the Court
of Appeals remanded to the district court. The Court of Appeals recognized
that the moods and expressions evoked by those five remanded artworks did
differ from those of Cariou’s original work, but nonetheless concluded that
those five works were simply too “similar in key aesthetic ways” to the originals to be transformative as a matter of law.138

Rogers, Blanch, and Cariou raise concerns for advocates of appropriation artists. First, the Supreme Court’s adoption of the transformative fair use test emphasizes transformation by aesthetic alteration
or addition of material and deemphasizes the transformative effect of
context.139 Context is an essential component of the appropriative
strategy as used by artists.140 Consider Sherry Levine’s series, After
Walker Evans, in which she did no more than “photograph[ ] reproduc135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 707 (majority opinion).
Id.
Graham v. Prince, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); see infra Appendix.
Graham, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 380–81 (citation omitted) (quoting Cariou, 714 F.3d
at 711).
139. Where Judge Leval asks whether the new work “adds value,” Leval, supra note
14, at 1111, Campbell asks whether it “adds something new,” Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). Although this may be a slight distinction, it does seem to shift the emphasis toward material alteration. See Heymann,
supra note 1, at 452 (“This language represents a subtle shift, to be sure, but one
that—at least on its face—seems to encourage courts to focus on whether the
second artist had added material to the first work to the exclusion of consideration of whether the artist has recontextualized the copyrighted work.”).
140. See supra section II.A. How transformative such a shift in context may appear to
Cariou’s reasonable observer is not clear, but to the extent the reasonable observer is in fact the judge, there is further cause for concern that recontextualization as an artistic strategy may be stifled.
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tions of Depression-era photographs by Walker Evans.”141 That series
became a “landmark of postmodernism, both praised and attacked as
a feminist hijacking of patriarchal authority, a critique of the commodification of art, and an elegy on the death of modernism.”142 How
could a focus on aesthetic difference possibly account for an important
work such as this? The little guidance under Campbell on how the
court can ascertain transformation in expression or meaning leaves
the court to go off little more than its own judgment, as seen in Blanch
and Cariou.
Second, the appropriation artist not engaged in parody is burdened
with the need to justify the act of borrowing, which raises at least two
concerns. First, the court must rely to some degree on the artist’s own
self-interested description of the purpose of their work, often by deposition after the litigation has already begun. Second, appropriation as
an artistic strategy has a claim to the need for unauthorized use and
for the need to be preserved as a socially beneficial artistic practice.
Like parody, it should be freed, when appropriate, from the requirement of providing a separate necessity-of-use justification.
The appropriative fair use approach proposed by this Article
makes two shifts that can arguably give courts a flexible standard
they can adapt to each case while freeing them from assessing
whether the defendant has added “enough meaning.” First, rather
than the question of whether a piece of appropriative art adds enough
material or alters the meaning enough to be transformative, the
courts need only assess whether—according to critics, galleries, and
other discursive communities—the piece is appropriation art. This not
only has the benefit of being a standard with objective evidentiary
sources, but it also recognizes that alteration in meaning may involve
little or no addition of material. Second, the shift to a tiered approach—based on the viewer’s familiarity with the earlier work or its
associations—in evaluating the third factor gives some objective criteria and ascertainable landmarks for the court to use, a manner of
evaluation more familiar to judges than art criticism.
VII. APPLICATION OF THE APPROPRIATIVE FAIR USE
DEFENSE
Richard Prince’s work provides a basis for hypothetical application
of this proposed framework. Prince’s oeuvre runs the gamut of appropriative purposes. Comparing Graduation to his Untitled (de Kooning),143 Untitled (Cowboy),144 and Washington Nurse145 pieces,
141. See After Walker Evans: 4, THE MET, https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection//
267214 [https://perma.unl.edu/6VXB-YUNG] (last visited Aug. 5, 2020).
142. Id.
143. See infra Appendix.
144. See infra Appendix.
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highlights the suggested framework’s ability to be tailored to various
situations while minimizing subjective inquiry. All four pieces would
be eligible to claim a right to appropriative fair use given Richard
Prince’s indisputable and long-established critical reception as an appropriation artist.
Untitled (de Kooning) and Untitled (Cowboy) have the strongest
claims to appropriative fair use. The de Kooning pieces are examples
of works that would fall in the first tier. They are comprised of works
by Willem de Kooning over which Prince has either drawn or pasted
additional elements such as torsos or legs. Works such as these are
meant to “embrace and critique a quintessentially American sensibility” as works of both “homage and desecration.”146 The piece relies on
the viewer’s recognition of de Kooning’s famous figures, and the extent
of Prince’s use appears tailored to this recognition. The risk of market
substitution might be present here—both works appeal to the same
audiences and compete for space in the same kinds of galleries. However, Prince’s claim to the amount of use needed is at is strongest
here.
Untitled (Cowboy) typifies second-tier use. It appropriates a potent
and clearly recognizable figure on the order of Marilyn Monroe—the
Marlboro Man—and so his borrowing is justified to the extent necessary to achieve that cultural shorthand for an American notion of
masculinity. Again, the amount appropriated seems proportional to
this purpose. The viewer needs to see the iconic Marlboro Man to recognize the cultural reference, and that figure is often depicted as surrounded by landscape, as is Prince’s figure. The risk of substitution for
cigarette advertisements—that cigarette advertisement purchasers
would purchase Prince’s work instead or that Marlboro is likely to exploit the derivative market of its advertisements being displayed as
works of fine art—seems more than a stretch.
Washington Nurse presents a closer case, lying somewhere near
the boundary between the second and third tier. There is no recognizable work—most viewers are probably not familiar with the campy
1967 novel—and no specific cultural icon, other than the general type
of a nurse. The pulp-fiction figure of the nurse does, however, evoke a
set of viewer associations—a presentation of femininity and intrigue
familiar to most. The extent of borrowing is not substantial, much of
the original cover is painted over and obscured. There may be a de145. See infra Appendix.
146. See Evelyne Politanoff, Richard Prince’s de Kooning Paintings at Gagosian Gallery Paris, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2011/03/28/richard-princes-de-kooning-paintings-at-gagosian-gallery-paris.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/V7EU-V35D]; Richard Prince: Spiritual America, GUGGENHEIM (June 4, 2007), http://www.guggenheim.org/teaching-materials/richard-prince-spiritual-america.
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mand for this kind of mid-twentieth century paperback artwork, and
this would weigh against fair use to the extent this demand may be
exploited in fine art galleries. The claim to the use is weaker here than
in the two examples above, but it seems likely that the application of
other factors would militate for a finding of fair use.
In Gradution and James Brown Disco Ball, however, the case for
appropriative use is least compelling. Cariou’s photographs are likely
not recognized by the viewer as specific, known works. Nor are the
figures in the work recognizable and potent cultural symbols. Thus,
while Prince may have a justification for use by virtue of his appropriative stratagem, the other factors are at their most limiting under this
tier. Still, James Brown Disco Ball took relatively little of Cariou’s
work, and that which was taken was substantially transformed
through over painting and juxtaposition with other bits of collage. Because of the degree of change, the interpretive distance between the
two, as judged by discursive communities, would likely be large and
the risk of substitution minimal. Cariou’s photographs center on Rastafarians in classical poses surrounded by their environs a la Edward
Curtis. Prince’s James Brown Disco Ball bears practically no resemblance to this sort of composition and so evidence of a risk for substitution seems small.
Graduation appropriated the borrowed work, with the thick layers
of jungle in the background and the long dreadlocks of the figure, to
create association in furtherance of Prince’s purposed moods and
themes. Again the other factors loom larger. Here, the entire piece is
appropriated and the associations Prince achieves may not justify the
extent of borrowing. Perhaps it could be argued that the amount of
jungle-strewn space surrounding the figure in Cariou’s work was necessary to appropriate in full to achieve the desired mood, but the minimally-altered nature of the borrowing and the lack contextual shift
weighs against this argument. This indicates that perhaps the interpretive distance achieved by the appropriation in this piece would be
small, but viewers of the entire show might view the context of its
exhibition as substantially transformative. Perhaps most condemning,
the risk of substitution is great here both because the appropriated
work is one that is also displayed in galleries and because so much of
it is borrowed in the new work. Specifically, Prince’s work may usurp
the derivative market of Cariou’s exhibition in fine art galleries.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The fair use inquiry has expanded in recent decades, and some
may view its current breadth as too great. It could be that adoption of
the transformative use test has given courts too much license, or that
this has been a way of pushing back against the expansion of copyright enforcement and the extension of the copyright period. Irrespec-
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tive of these trends, certain types of uses must be viewed as vital to
the progress of the arts and as deserving of special consideration.
Some opinions and commentators speak of appropriation in the arts as
a recent, postmodern sleight-of-hand that is little more than piracy.
But the fact is that it has a centrality and importance to the progress
of the arts every bit as legitimate as criticism, education, parody, satire, and other uses thought to be within the ambit of fair use
eligibility.
In recognizing this, the courts could both preserve appropriation
art and eliminate their indulgence in aesthetic judgment by recognizing appropriation art’s categorical claim to tranformativeness and the
need for some use of earlier works. By shifting the inquiry to whether
a piece of art is appropriation art, the court could rely on a vieweroriented approach, putting it in more familiar territory. Furthermore,
by recognizing three tiers of appropriative purpose in appropriation
art—evocation of the viewer’s (1) knowledge of a particular work; (2)
knowledge of a recognizable, potent cultural symbol; and (3) nonspecific associations—the court can again engage in an application of the
third fair use factor that is more analytically rigorous than the current
case law provides. Whether this approach would be effective or would
create more problems than it solves would need to be determined in
the crucible of case law, but the current situation appears dissatisfying to many.
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APPENDIX

Art Rogers, Puppies, 1980

Jeff Koons, String of Puppies, 1988

Andrea Blanch, Silk Sandals, 2000

Jeff Koons, Niagara, 2000
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Édouard Manet, Olympia, 1863

Titian, Venus of Urbino, 1538

Giorgione, Sleeping Venus, 1508–1510

730

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, 1917

Sherry Levine, Fountain (After Duchamp: 1), 1981
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Andy Warhol, Marilyn Diptych, 1962

Claes Oldenburg, Clothespin, 1976
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Norman Rockwell, The Connoisseur, 1961

Yasumasa Morimura, Portrait (Futago), 1988
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Richard Prince, Untitled (de Kooning),
2006

Willem de Kooning, Woman and Bicycle,
1952-53

Richard Prince, Untitled (Cowboy), 1989

Tracy Adams, Washington Nurse, 1963

Richard Prince, Washington Nurse, 2002
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Richard Prince, James Brown Disco Ball, 2008

Patrick Cariou, Photograph from Yes Rasta, 2000

Richard Prince, Graduation, 2008
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Donald Graham, Rastafarian Smoking a
Joint, 1996

Richard Prince, Untitled, 2014

Sherry Levine, After Walker Evans: 4, 1981

